Martes 3 de marzo del 2026

The Supreme Court issued a ruling on February 20 vacating all U.S. tariffs imposed under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), including tariffs labeled “baseline” (10% on most countries), “reciprocal” (higher than 10% and varying by country), and “trafficking” or “fentanyl” tariffs imposed on Canada, Mexico, and China.

The 6-3 decision was written by Chief Justice John Roberts, who wrote: “Had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs [under IEEPA], it would have done so expressly.” The ruling makes clear all duties paid under IEEPA must be refunded.

President Trump later that day issued an executive order (“Ending Certain Tariff Actions“) declaring the IEEPA tariffs “shall no longer be in effect and, as soon as practicable, shall no longer be collected.” CBP stopped collecting the IEEPA tariffs at 12:00 a.m. ET on February 24.

“Reset Tariff Policy.” The Chamber welcomed the news in a press statement by Neil Bradley, Executive Vice President and Chief Policy Officer. He noted the economic damage inflicted by the tariffs, especially for small businesses; and he called for swift refunds: “We encourage the administration to use this opportunity to reset overall tariff policy in a manner that will lead to greater economic growth, larger wage gains for workers, and lower costs for families.”

The Chamber filed an amicus brief in Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. arguing that the challenged tariffs were enacted in excess of statutory authority and are causing irreparable harm to businesses of all sizes.

Temporary Tariffs: In a February 20 proclamation entitled “Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems,” the White House set in motion new 10% tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 effective February 24.

However, in a social media post the next day President Trump said he intended to raise the rate to 15%. Section 122 allows the executive to set duties at a rate no higher than 15% for 150 days. A White House official told the press on February 23 that the 15% rate is “being worked on still.”

Familiar Exceptions: The proclamation lays out a wide range of carveouts that is almost identical to those provided under the IEEPA tariffs. The Section 122 duties do not apply to energy products, certain minerals and metals, many agricultural products, goods subject to Section 232 investigations or tariffs, and USMCA-compliant goods from Canada and Mexico.

‌The exceptions to the Section 122 tariffs are perhaps 99% identical to those under the IEEPA tariffs. Additions to the duty-free list include textiles and apparel products from the six CAFTA-DR countries that comply with the terms of that agreement; also added are printed materials. The proclamation links to an Annex and Annex 2, which detail these exceptions.

More Legal Questions? Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows tariffs up to 15% for no more than 150 days to address “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits.” It has no requirement for notice and comment.

However, questions over the legality of Section 122 tariffs have quickly come to the fore. Of note, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice argued before the Court of International Trade that the IEEPA tariffs “did not identify or focus on balance-of-payments concerns of the type addressed by Section 122. Instead, the concerns the President identified in declaring an emergency arise from trade deficits, which are conceptually distinct from balance-of-payments deficits.”

Indeed, economic commentators note that Section 122 was crafted to address balance-of-payments problems that can only arise under a fixed exchange rate regime of the kind that had just collapsed at the time the Trade Act of 1974 was enacted. These commentators avow no balance-of-payments crisis as described in the statute exists today.

A Short-Term Fix: Section 122 tariffs may remain in place for more than 150 days only with congressional assent, but support in Congress for an extension appears insufficient at present. It isn’t clear if litigation over tariffs of such relative brevity will materialize, though the duties are expected to generate approximately $40 billion in revenue for the Treasury in this period—and the possibility of securing reimbursement may prove attractive to some litigants.

A Third Wave of Tariffs: USTR is expected to quickly initiate Section 301 tariff investigations that will take a few weeks at least. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer has described Section 301 tariffs are “very durable” legally; to that point, the Section 301 tariffs on imports from China implemented beginning in 2018 have withstood legal challenge. The administration appears to see these Section 301 tariffs as the core of what they hope will be a more durable tariff regime.

Most of these new Section 301 investigations are not expected to be country-specific but instead will assume a global scope across “areas of concern such as industrial excess capacity, forced labor, pharmaceutical pricing practices, discrimination against U.S. technology companies and digital goods and services, digital services taxes, ocean pollution, and practices related to the trade in seafood, rice, and other products” (according to a statement by Greer). The administration will also continue its existing Section 301 undertaking on China and its investigation relating to Brazil.

“Reciprocal” Trade Deals: Greer has repeated in recent days that, in the wake of the invalidation of the IEEPA tariffs, the administration would prioritize “continuity” by maintaining lists of excluded products and retaining its so-called “agreements on reciprocal trade.” Greer has said these “legally binding” agreements will remain in place even as the related U.S. tariffs are imposed under other legal authorities (with countries such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia seeing reduced rates).

However, questions persist on how the Section 122 tariffs will interact with those trade deals. The EU negotiated an all-in ceiling of 15% tariffs (including MFN duties), but the new proclamation would appear to stack the 10% Section 122 tariffs with MFN duties that in some cases would send the total rate above 15% or 20%; Japan and Korea have similar arrangements. The exceptions in the proclamation may not align with those negotiated in the country-by-country “agreements on reciprocal trade.” Further, for many other countries, the possible hiking of Section 122 tariffs to 15% looms as a sudden and unexpected increase from 10%—and not just countries with trade deals: This includes FTA partners such as Australia as well as many Latin American and African countries that had previously faced a 10% headline rate.

Enforcement Tariffs: In a February 25 interview with Fox Business, Greer said new Section 301 and 232 investigations would provide “the enforcement mechanism to make sure that countries comply with their deals,” noting that tariff rates would only go up if “countries reneged on their deals or doubled down on these unfair trade practices.”

Malaysia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Bangladesh, Taiwan, and Indonesia have signed “agreements on reciprocal trade.” Only one country, Cambodia, has implemented its tariff-reduction and NTB-related commitments. Many other countries have signed Joint Statements with the United States that are precursors to these somewhat more elaborate agreements.

China is Different: China is in a different position given the Section 301 undertaking dating back to 2018. The tariffs imposed beginning in that year on select Chinese goods—and modified several times since then, including expansions in scope during the Biden administration—can be altered on short order.

This procedure requires publishing a proposed modification in the Federal Register, conducting a 30-day comment period, completing a rapid review, and issuing a final notice with an effective date 15-30 days later. This process can be concluded in approximately eight weeks and affords a relatively simple way to replicate the IEEPA tariffs on goods from China.

The Trump administration also holds two legacy Section 301 proceedings—one covering legacy semiconductors and one tied to Phase One commitments—but both are effectively paused. Attempting to activate or expand either as a substitute for lost IEEPA tariffs could be seen as upsetting the trade truce with China reached in October in Busan, Korea—and the administration is keen to avoid doing so as the president prepares to travel to China from March 31 to April 2.

More “National Security” Tariffs, Too. In addition, rumors are swirling that the administration may soon launch new investigations into whether certain imports “threaten to impair the national security” under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Wall Street Journal reported that such investigations may be launched into “large-scale batteries, cast iron and iron fittings, plastic piping, industrial chemicals and power grid and telecom equipment.”

What About Refunds? The president’s comments on Friday suggested the administration will not take a cooperative stance on IEEPA tariff refunds, and a February 26 report in Politico appears to affirm this. On the other hand, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Greer have publicly deferred to the Court of International Trade.

‌Department of Justice attorneys had earlier declared that “If tariffs imposed on plaintiffs during these appeals are ultimately held unlawful, then the government will issue refunds to plaintiffs, including any post-judgment interest that accrues.” CBP must pay importers of record interest on refunds of customs duties and tariffs, and the current interest rate on overpayments to 6% and is calculated from the entry date to the date paid.

Hard Way or the Easy Way: The Court of International Trade will play a key role, but it appears clear the administration could expedite the lawfully required reimbursement of all the IEEPA duties collected over the past year—or complicate it. As a reminder, tariff refunds are not at all unusual (e.g., after a tariff preference program lapses and is reauthorized retroactively), and CBP has recently shifted to an entirely electronic refund process. The Chamber has published a fact sheet on refunds for small businesses. The Chamber is addressing these issues in a series of webinars for members.

What Did We Learn? The White House may be able to recreate the IEEPA tariffs in the aggregate under other authorities—for a few months or more durably. However, IEEPA appealed to the executive as an easy-to-use, point-and-shoot tariff tool——what one commentator has called his “magic tariff Sharpie.” However, it proved too “good” to be true.

The administration has not issued new tariffs since September, but the president has issued at least a dozen tariff threats in that time, and all appeared to depend on IEEPA (e.g., tariffs on any country “doing business” with Iran or on any country selling oil to Cuba). Other tariff statutes generally have procedural guardrails that provide a span of time allowing for assessment and reflection. As a result, the loss of IEEPA as a tariff tool may signal a less volatile tariff regime.